Big or Bloated? The Rapid Growth of the East African Community
Regional alliances are gaining importance increasingly as trade dynamics and geopolitical competition shape the global landscape. With the rapid expansion of the East African Community (EAC), one cannot help but question the bloc's ability to integrate new members without losing cohesion. Can the EAC capitalise on its extended reach, or will the burden of its ambitions cause the foundation to crack?
The East African Community is a regional intergovernmental organisation comprising of eight partner states as of September 2024: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Initially founded in 1967, the EAC collapsed in 1977 but was re-established in 2000 by Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Over the past decade, the EAC has seen rapid expansion with the addition of South Sudan in 2016, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022, and Somalia in 2023.
Political Implications
The EAC expansion poses several benefits to the political sphere. With new entrants currently undergoing periods of instability, the bloc allows more stable countries to pioneer peace processes and address hostility in member states. Through enhanced security measures, including a collaborative combat force composed of 12,000 soldiers, the bloc reflects a chance to tackle regional instability with greater force. Further, the bloc presents the opportunity to strengthen political ties and standardise governance frameworks among member states as heads of state convene and institutions interact.
Though the potential to counter regional instability is certainly present, the EAC tends to place trade and expansion ahead of addressing internal issues. For instance, following the introduction of the DRC to the bloc in 2022, the EAC implemented the Common External Tariff (CET), which included a 0% tariff on raw materials and capital goods; while the bloc focused on economic growth, the number of people displaced by conflict in the DRC continued to rise with 2.5 million people in North Kivu forced to flee.
Regardless of the members added, interstate strife within the EAC has been and continues to be pertinent, undermining regional trust. An example is the prolonged disagreement lasting over ten years between Uganda and Kenya over territorial claims around the Migingo Island. Further, differences in political interest prevent alignment from occurring when executing regulatory protocols. For instance, Kenya tends to favour liberalised trade policies that contribute to their goal to assert greater leadership within the EAC, however Tanzania tends to take a more cautious approach to maintain greater control over their domestic economy. This divergence can explain some of the reasons behind the delayed implementation of the CET.
Economic Implications
The expansion of the EAC presents vast opportunities for intra-regional trade and investment. Somalia's admission to the bloc and the potential introduction of Ethiopia and Djibouti could create a broader market of around 800 million people. The current benefits of introducing Somalia to the bloc include a reduction in trade barriers and increased access to 3,000 km of Somalia's coastline, the longest in Africa. Further, the expansion is a potential attraction to foreign investment as an increase in market size presents the region as a more attractive investment destination. This suggests that the bloc can be immensely beneficial as it leads to widened opportunities for landlocked countries in the community to trade more readily.
Despite the substantial opportunity, the current transportation, community and energy networks fail to enable the bloc to experience the benefits of increased interconnectivity due to the lack of sustained investment in infrastructure. Hypothetically speaking, the DRC's membership should allow the community to access a West African coastline, a formidable prospect for trade across the continent. Nonetheless, the only mode of transport to cut across the DRC is by air, an exorbitantly expensive mechanism for most. Additionally, in the eyes of foreign investors, the marks of instability, both politically and macroeconomically, are likely cause for apprehension.
Social and Cultural Implications
The growth of the EAC continues to present several social benefits, such as the advancement of women in multiple spheres. Though gender inequalities persist and vary throughout the region, the expansion of the EAC opens employment opportunities for women, with informal cross-border trade being one of the 'major activities for self-employed women' in the informal economy. Furthermore, in terms of political participation, the region excels relative to both Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, with Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda implementing quotas resulting in increased participation of women in political decision-making. Rwanda leads with more than 60% of seats held by women in the lower house of parliament.
However, the free movement of labour may result in significant discrepancies in the labour market environment across member states, leading to tension between migrants and locals. Stronger economies in the bloc tend to attract workers from weaker economies. This could result in the local population perceiving migrant workers as threats to their livelihood. This inevitably introduces xenophobic sentiments, which may 'strain social cohesion.’ Take, for instance, the 2018 crackdown on undocumented migrant workers in Kenya, which led the population to perceive foreign workers as illegitimate and potentially detrimental to their communities.
Linguistically, the region’s diversity can be embraced while enhancing the integration of Swahili as one of the region’s official languages. There have been recent endorsements for Swahili, especially after the African Union adopted it as its sixth working language in February 2022. However, regions like Western DRC and other parts of the bloc still need to be proficient in the language. As of 2024, English is the most widely spoken language in the bloc.
Solutions
To harmonise political systems, the EAC should develop a framework which standardises policy areas to foster the implementation of common market and customs union protocols. This could be done in the form of criteria for membership, such as the EU's Copenhagen Criteria, which guarantees entry to all that possess fundamental components such as the rule of law, human rights and so on. Further, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) recommends that implementing panel proceedings would offer immense support in conjunction with robust peacekeeping mechanisms exhibited in blocs like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
To tackle economic obstacles, the bloc must shift from bolstering trade by reducing inter-state barriers to investing in transport corridors such as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. DRC's potential for a more extensive continental reach could also be explored. The EAC could finance these endeavours through public-private partnerships (PPPs) and development banks like the African Development Bank (AfDB). To reduce the risk for foreign investors, the EAC could follow the lead of the African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI), which has founded a Regional Liquidity Support Facility (RLSF) that offers insurance for investors who choose to invest in high-risk areas and gives them a sense of reassurance, allowing the bloc to attract foreign investment more readily.
The bloc could establish community-based labour hubs to create a more amicable approach to labour migration in the face of labour mobility issues. They ensure that job seekers are paired with employers based on that region’s needs, ensuring incoming workers fill a gap instead of competing with locals. This has been implemented in the EU by the European Labour Authority (EURES), which, among many things, pairs job vacancies with CVs across the continent and provides targeted ‘services for frontier workers and employers’ in cross-border areas, thus mitigating social tensions by filling essential roles as opposed to displacing local workers.
To address the challenge of linguistic diversity, the EAC should capitalise on promoting Swahili and work towards making it the regional lingua franca. The language can be integrated into member states' national curriculums, as is already being done in Ugandan primary schools. Furthermore, there can be initiatives such as scholarships for students in non-Swahili-speaking areas to study in Swahili-speaking countries, as well as media campaigns. Through these cultural exchanges, the EAC could improve the sense of regional identity and assist communication between member states.
Conclusion
The EAC stands at the point where it risks failing to adapt to its unique challenges and leverage the possibilities presented, leading to a persistent cycle of futile expansion. However, effectively managed growth can facilitate the harvesting of vast opportunities that the bloc's expansion creates to reach record-breaking levels of economic advancement. Through collective efforts, the bloc’s growth can pave the way for fortified regional ties, increased intra-regional trade, and greater security. The pertinence of internal political stability, poor infrastructure and social tensions underscore the need for a more outstanding commitment to nuanced collaboration.
To address these problems, the EAC should prioritise creating governance frameworks that allow states to synchronise and invest diligently in infrastructure projects and social cohesion structures. Targeted strategies such as establishing labour hubs, promoting Swahili, and providing investment guarantees will allow the EAC to build a more efficient bloc. Through carefully crafted, pragmatic solutions, the bloc could become the cornerstone for sustainable development in the region and drive collective progress for all its inhabitants.